Disillusionment: A prototype analysis by Maher, Paul J et al.





[This paper was accepted for publication in 
Cognition and Emotion] 
Disillusionment: A Prototype Analysis 
 
Paul J. Maher & Eric R. Igou 
University of Limerick 
 Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg 







Paul J. Maher & Eric R. Igou; Department of Psychology; University of Limerick; 
Limerick; Republic of Ireland. Wijnand A. P. van Tilburg; Psychology Department; Institute 
of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience; King’s College London; London, United 
Kingdom. 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE/FUNDING: 
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research and/or 
authorship of this article: The Irish Research Council 
  
DISILLUSIONMENT  2 
 
Abstract 
Disillusionment is acknowledged to be a painful process with important personal and social 
consequences. However, scientific conceptualisations of the experience are inconsistent. 
Across four studies, we examined whether lay conceptions of disillusionment produce a 
consistent pattern of features. In Study 1 (N = 204), we extracted 19 features of 
disillusionment from open-ended participant definitions. In Study 2 (N = 131), participants 
rated the centrality of these features and indicated that features such as discovery, 
disappointment, and loss, were highly representative, while features such as hopelessness, 
orientation, and truth, were more peripheral. In two further studies, we used experimental 
designs to test the diagnosticity of these features. In Study 3 (N = 155), participants rated 
vignettes descriptions as more disillusioning when they were based on more, rather than less, 
prototypical disillusionment features. Given that disappointment is a feature of 
disillusionment, we conducted Study 4 (N = 64) to test whether the extracted features 
effectively distinguish disillusionment from disappointment. Overall, we found evidence to 
suggest that disillusionment contains a consistent set of features, and represents a state of 
negative epistemic affect associated with the violation of core assumptions. These results 
create avenues for research on disillusionment, its antecedents and its consequences. 
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Disillusionment: A Prototype Analysis 
Psychology has a history of examining how people respond when their cherished 
assumptions or treasured worldviews are challenged (Festinger, 1957; Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Recently, there has been a surge in interest in the affective or 
emotional side of this process (Maher, Igou, & Van Tilburg, 2018; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; 
Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). For example, researchers have begun investigating epistemic 
emotions; emotions related to learning and knowledge (Litman, Hutchins, & Russon, 2005; 
Maher, Van Tilburg, & Igou, 2019; Pekrun, Vogl, Muis, & Sinatra, 2016; Silvia, 2008). 
Similarly, we approach research on the violation of treasured worldviews, or assumptions, by 
exploring the experience of disillusionment.  
Disillusionment is associated with epistemic challenges that involve a stark 
contradiction or even a shattering of core beliefs about the world (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & 
Berg, 1998). Although the experience has been associated with personal and social 
consequences like divorce (Huston, Caughlin, Houts, Smith, & George, 2001), aggression 
(Van Tilburg, Igou, Maher, & Lennon, 2019), and political polarization (Block, 2011; 
Fuchsman, 2008; Maher et al., 2018), conceptualizations of disillusionment are inconsistent. 
Much previous research has examined how people defensively manage the violation of 
treasured beliefs (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956), and we view 
disillusionment as an initial emotional manifestation of having these defences fully breached. 
To further elucidate the nature of the experience, we examine the common features of 
disillusionment with the aim of establishing a reliable conceptualisation to augment future 
research.    
Contradictions of Treasured Beliefs 
Interest in the defence and maintenance of treasured beliefs has formed the basis of 
many influential models of social psychology, including one of the foundational works of the 
DISILLUSIONMENT  4 
 
field—the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). A memorable example of 
cognitive dissonance research concerns Festinger and colleagues’ (1956) case study of “The 
Seekers”; a UFO cult who believed the world would end in a flood on December 21st , 1954. 
Festinger and colleagues focused on the fact that after this date passed (with no flood), much 
of the group strengthened their conviction and became increasingly evangelical about their 
beliefs. Historical tales provide further examples of proselyting in response to contradiction 
(see Festinger et al., 1956) and many have documented similar processes today (e.g., “The 
backfire effect”; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Thus, the cognitive processes and behavioural 
consequences of attempts to defend threatened beliefs have been well-documented (Festinger, 
1957; Greenberg et al., 1990; Heine et al., 2006).  
Importantly, strong epistemic contradictions do not always lead to defensive 
bolstering (Park, Edmondson, Fenster, & Blank, 2008) and might be subject to preconditions 
(Festinger et al., 1956). Furthermore, recent research suggests that people will most often 
update their views in line with new information, even if it contradicts their beliefs (Guess & 
Coppock, 2018; O’Connor, Maher, & Kadianaki, 2019). Overall, there is more to the 
experience of epistemic contradictions than dissonance (e.g., Park, 2010; Janoff-Bulman & 
Berg, 1998). Experiences that threaten important meaning frameworks can penetrate 
defensive barriers and shatter core beliefs, leaving people in a state of disillusionment 
(Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 1998). Although disillusioning experiences may have important 
consequences for individuals and society as a whole (Block, 2011; Huston et al., 2001; 
Fuchsman, 2008; Maher et al., 2018), there is little consensus among researchers over what 
disillusionment is. 
Conceptualizations of Disillusionment 
Definitions of the term disillusionment are many and varied. The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines disillusion as “being defeated in expectation or hope” (“disillusionment,” 
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[def. 1], n.d.). The reference to expectations conveys the epistemic nature of disillusionment, 
but the definition also portrays an affective state of negative valence. Interestingly, the 
etymology of the word disillusion suggests that early use of the term referred to the feeling of 
“being free from illusion”, which indicates a more positive valence, at least with regard to 
criteria of rationality and living without (the so dearly held) illusions. Nevertheless, most 
current conceptualizations, which focus on immediate experiences of disillusionment, are 
overtly negative, and this notion is reflected in definitions provided in the psychological 
literature. 
Researchers from various domains in psychology provide different definitions of 
disillusionment. In political psychology, Block (2011) defines disillusionment as a gap 
between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’, which is quite broad. In relationship research, 
Niehuis and Bartell (2006) operationalize disillusionment as a decline in positive affect, 
positive perceptions of a partner, and a corresponding increase in negative affect and negative 
perceptions, or more generally, as a perceived change for the worse in relationship quality 
over time (Niehuis, Reifman, & Lee, 2015). Besides defining disillusionment in relationship 
terms, this approach also places an emphasis on the role of self-deceiving idealization in 
disillusioning experiences (Niehuis, Lee, Reifman, Swenson, & Hunsaker, 2011). Similarly, 
Janoff-Bulman and Berg (1998) describe disillusionment as a painful despair that arises from 
the violation of the fundamental assumptions people rely on to make sense of the world. 
Contrastingly, in decision making research, disillusionment has been operationalized as a 
feeling that accompanies performing below expectations on a simple puzzle (Heath & 
Jourden, 1997). Overall, academic conceptualizations point to remarkable, and in part 
fascinating, aspects of disillusionment, but are quite inconsistent.  
Without a coherent definition of disillusionment, it is difficult to discern if these 
researchers are tapping into different forms of disillusionment, if they are measuring distinct 
DISILLUSIONMENT  6 
 
phenomena, or if they are actually studying disillusionment correlates. A coherent 
conceptualisation of disillusionment can reveal common contexts and features of the 
experience that will enable researchers to reliably test and measure disillusion. Ultimately, 
more conceptual and definitional clarity around this concept can guide future research. 
Examining Disillusionment: Adopting a Prototype Approach 
 A common approach to establishing concept clarity in psychological research is to 
examine lay conceptions (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 
2012; Kinsella, Ritchie, & Igou, 2015). Analyses of lay conceptions reveal how 
psychological constructs are used in everyday life and thus help researchers to reliably link 
them to behaviours and contexts (e.g., Kinsella et al., 2015). Indeed, it is important that 
psychological constructs reflect everyday conceptions; otherwise, they could turn out to be 
irrelevant to people’s lives (Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, & Kumashiro, 2008). Knowing how lay 
people understand concepts like disillusionment can allow researchers to design studies 
tailored to these lay conceptualizations and thus improve construct validity. Accordingly, to 
develop and validate a coherent conceptualisation of disillusionment, we examine the 
common conceptions people hold. 
Given the inconsistent nature of the disillusionment literature, we chose to examine 
the features of this experience using a prototype approach. This approach provides an 
inherent hierarchical structure of feature typicality, rather than presenting a definition that 
aims to be specific. In part, the trouble lies in the nature of affective states, which tend to be 
fuzzy, complex, and imprecise (Clore & Ortony, 1988; Fehr & Russel, 1984); however, 
literature shows that for affective states, prototypes are a useful way to represent such 
concepts. Indeed, similar affective concepts such as gratitude (Lambert, Graham, & Fincham, 
2009), love (Fitness & Felcher, 1993), and nostalgia (Hepper et al., 2012), have previously 
been represented using a prototype approach (Fehr & Russell, 1984; see also Cantor & 
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Mischel, 1977). Prototype analyses aim to identify representative categories of different 
concepts by examining affective, cognitive, and motivational features and grouping them 
according to their centrality (Hepper et al., 2012). 
 In summary, disillusionment has been rarely, vaguely, and inconsistently defined in 
psychological literature. Nevertheless, this literature suggests that it has profound personal 
and social consequences (Huston et al., 2001; Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 1998; Maher et al., 
2018). Thus, there are theoretical and practical reasons for researching the nature of 
disillusionment. We combine a data-driven prototype-approach, in conjunction with a 
theoretical framework, to suggest that the prototype structure of disillusionment will reflect a 
state of negative epistemic affect, associated with the contradiction of broad and meaningful 
knowledge structures. We aim to offer a compelling foundation for future research on the 
nature of disillusionment, its predictors, its experiences, and its consequences.  
Study 1: Common Features of Disillusionment  
The aim of Study 1 was to identify common features of the concept of 
disillusionment. We instructed participants to list the characteristics of disillusionment in an 
open-ended response format. We then used NVivo plus textual analysis software to identify 
the most commonly occurring features. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 204 participants (138 women; Mage = 25.52, SD = 9.90; 
age range: 18 – 60 years) via email on an Irish university campus. All university students 
were sent an email inviting them to participate in a brief online study and providing a link for 
them to take part. They were required to be fluent English speakers. Participants resided in 
the UK and Ireland (n =196), elsewhere in Europe (n = 4), or the USA (n = 4). 
Procedure. Participants were invited to take part in a study about the characteristics 
and features of disillusionment. After consenting to participate, participants were given the 
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following instructions: “We would like you to think about the features and characteristics 
of disillusionment. Take 5 minutes to jot down as many things that come to mind in the box 
below. You should write anything you associate with disillusionment; there are no right or 
wrong answers.” Following this, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
 For the first step in our prototype analysis, participants’ descriptions of 
disillusionment were divided into 628 different exemplars. An exemplar is either one item or 
one “unit of meaning” from multiple connected statements (Hepper et al., 2012; Joffe & 
Yardley, 2004). Each participant generated an average of 3.1 exemplars (e.g., “a sense of 
loss”, “misunderstanding”, “unmet expectations”). Next, we identified and removed 
idiosyncratic exemplars that could not be considered features of disillusionment and would 
confound the analysis. Exemplars were deemed idiosyncratic if they described the object of a 
participant’s personal experience with disillusionment (e.g., “the game SIM city”), or if they 
seemed irrelevant to the question (e.g., “the colour purple”). 
 The remaining exemplars were uploaded to NVivo plus for textual analysis. We 
conducted a word frequency analysis and grouped words that were synonyms of each other 
using NVivo’s internal dictionary. Through this analysis the 2,633 words within the text were 
grouped into 871 different categories (i.e., words and synonyms) that were each given a 
weighted percentage reflecting the frequency of the word relative to the total words analysed. 
As a word may fit more than 1 category, the weighted percentage assigns a portion of the 
word's frequency to each one so that the overall total does not exceed 100%. Each category 
included a list of similar words from the data that help describe the group. We extracted 
features from these 871 categories in four steps.  
Firstly, only categories that received a weighted percentage of over 0.5% were 
considered eligible to form a feature. This left us with 38 candidate features. Next, we 
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removed categories that referred to objects of disillusionment (e.g., “something”, 
“someone”), categories that referred to verbs with no specific relation to disillusionment (e.g., 
“comes”, “going”) and categories that directly referred to disillusionment (e.g., 
“disillusioned”, “disillusionment”). This left us with a sample of 24 candidate features. In the 
third step, we combined categories that described the same feature (e.g., “thought” and 
“thinking”). We judged categories as describing the same feature if they shared three or more 
words. The aggregated the weighted frequencies of combined categories as these figures were 
distributed among all 871 word-groups to ensure that the total did not exceed 100%. In a final 
step, we sought to add the weighted frequency of categories we excluded in Step 1, to the 
features we established in Step 3, whenever they described the same feature. This allowed us 
to estimate a more accurate weighted frequency number for each feature. As in Step 3, 
categories were combined if they shared 3 or more similar words and only categories that 
contained a weighted percentage of over 0.1% were combined (e.g., “find” and “discover”). 
Overall, we extracted of 19 features from the data. Table 1 lists these features alongside an 
example of their use in the raw data. It is important to note that these examples do not define 
particular features, but rather embed them into the meaningful context provided by 
participants in this Study. 
 The features we distilled suggest that disillusionment involves both epistemic 
(discovery, expectations, reality, idea, truth) and affective (feeling, disappointment, sad, loss, 
hopelessness) components. On an epistemic level, disillusionment is associated with a 
discovery that violates expectations in a predominantly negative fashion. Features such as 
truth and reality reveal that disillusionment concerns topics that are central to people’s 
understanding of the world. The fact that the affective features were overtly negative and 
relatively extreme (e.g., “an intense feeling of disappointment”) indicates that disillusionment 
represents a violation of core knowledge structures. The features of orientation, reality, and 
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truth are, in this context, relatively neutral. Finally, categories of trust and betrayal reflect a 
social element to disillusionment. These features are associated with the experience of being 
let down or disappointed by others. 
 Table 1 provides the weighted percentage applied to each grouping through the 
NVivo analysis. These ratings provide an initial indication of the representativeness of each 
feature. More specifically, they reflect how easily different features come to mind when 
people consider the concept of disillusionment. However, in line with previous prototype 
research (e.g., Hepper et al., 2012; Kinsella et al., 2015), we sought to further assess the 
representativeness of each feature by collecting centrality ratings from a separate sample of 
participants. 
Study 2: Centrality of Disillusionment Features  
 In Study 2, we sought to assess the centrality of the features distilled in Study 1. That 
is, we assessed the representativeness of the common features of disillusionment. In keeping 
with earlier research using this approach (e.g., Hepper et al., 2012; Kinsella et al., 2015), we 
asked an independent sample of participants to rate how well each of the 19 features related 
to the concept of disillusionment.  
Method 
Participants. We recruited participants via Mturk. Participants were required to be 
fluent English speakers to take part. Initially, we had 167 completed survey responses. To 
screen data for careless responding, the study included an attention check that asked 
participants to give a specific response to a specific question and there was also a language 
fluency check that asked participants to describe the experience of disillusionment in their 
own words. Participants were excluded if they failed the attention check (n = 7), failed to give 
a description of disillusionment (e.g., wrote nothing; n = 9), completed the study in under 2 
minutes (n = 10), or a combination of the three criteria (n = 10). This left us with a final 
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sample of 131 participants (48 women; Mage = 35.73, SD = 10.64; age range: 18 – 64 years) 
for analysis. Each participant was compensated with 0.50 US dollars for their participation. 
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be shown a list of features 
associated with the word disillusionment and that accompanying each word would be a 
context that explains how the feature relates to disillusionment (see Table 1). Their task was 
to rate how closely each feature related to the concept of disillusionment on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all related) to 8 (extremely related).  
Results and Discussion 
 The mean centrality rating for each feature is presented in Table 1. Ratings ranged 
from 4.46 to 6.02, with a mean rating of M = 5.34, 95% CI [5.26, 5.41]. To test the reliability 
of these ratings we computed a two-way mixed effects intra-class correlation (ICC), treating 
the 19 features as cases and the 131 participants as items (Koo & Li, 2016). ICC assesses the 
reliability of ratings by comparing the variability of different ratings on the same cases to the 
total variation across all ratings and all cases. The ICC coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 
values closer to 1 indicating stronger reliability. Importantly, we found that participant ratings 
displayed strong reliability (ICC = .83, 95% CI [.79, .87]). Overall, in line with the notion 
that the concept of disillusionment reflects a prototype structure, participants considered 
some features as more central than others and there was strong consistency across these 
ratings. 
 We found that discovery, disappointment, expectations, false/wrong, feeling, loss, and 
reality, rated as highly representative. This corroborated findings from Study 1 where these 
features received high ‘weighted percentage’ ratings (i.e., ratings above the median), 
indicating that they come to mind easily for participants when they think of disillusionment. 
This reinforces the notion that conceptualisations of disillusionment contain both epistemic 
and affective core components. The presence of reality as a core feature highlights the 
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existential character of disillusionment. Also, in line with Study 1, we found that the features 
orientation, bad, idea, sadness, truth, and hopelessness ranked among the less representative 
features. Interestingly, both orientation and hopelessness are future orientated features, while 
idea refers to the past or antecedents of disillusionment (e.g., preconceived ideas). In contrast, 
features with higher ratings refer to short-term present experiences. 
There was also some discrepancies between the findings of Study 1 and Study 2. 
Specifically, we found relatively high centrality ratings for illusion, betrayal, and trust in this 
study, but relatively low weighted percentages in Study 1. Also, features of thinking, 
goodness, and confusion were given high weighted percentages in Study 1 but received low 
centrality ratings in Study 21. Thus, these features may be less reliable in their 
representativeness. Interestingly, betrayal, trust, and illusion refer to the social features of 
disillusionment. Divergent definitions of disillusionment differentially emphasise either 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., Huston et al., 2001; Niehuis et al., 2011), or falsified 
predictions (Block, 2011; Fuchsman, 2008). The variability in findings on the social features 
across studies may indicate that the Study 1 sample focused more on falsified predictions and 
less on interpersonal factors as core to the experience of disillusionment compared to the 
Study 2 sample. This could reflect the fact that the Study 1 participant sample was 
predominantly students. Nevertheless, the observed variability might enable us to identify the 
most representative features of disillusionment across different populations. 
Study 3: Feature Diagnosticity Tested  
In Study 1, we extracted features from open-ended descriptions of disillusionment. In 
Study 2, a separate group of participants rated the representativeness of these features in 
abstract form. In Study 3, we created vignettes to embed features in a novel context and 
                                                          
1 There was a significant sex difference on ratings for one of the 19 features. The feature of good (goodness) 
was rated as more central to disillusionment by female participants (M = 5.77, SD = 1.92) than by male 
participants (M = 4.70, SD = 2.23), F(1, 131) = 7.77, p = .006, η𝑝
2  = .057. This may help explain why goodness 
received a high weighted percentage in Study 1, which featured a higher proportion of female participants.  
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assess their diagnosticity. In other words, we investigated if these features act as cues that 
distinguish a disillusioning experience from a non-disillusioning experience. Prototypical 
features should represent the concepts they define in naturally occurring settings and 
effectively describe these concepts without using the concept term (Fehr & Russell, 1984). 
Furthermore, more central features should prove more diagnostic.  
Based on results from Studies 1 and 2, we created three separate categories to 
represent our overall findings on the prototype structure of disillusionment. Previous research 
used a similar procedure to model levels of prototypicality of a relatively complex everyday 
concept (modesty; Gregg et al., 2008). Accordingly, we divided the features of 
disillusionment into three categories. We performed median splits of the weighted percentage 
scores from Study 1 and centrality ratings in Study 2. A feature was considered central if it 
ranked in the top split in both Studies 1 and 2. Features ranked in the lower split in both 
Studies 1 and 2 were labelled as peripheral. Features that ranked in the top split of Study 1 or 
Study 2, but not both, were labelled as intermediate. We tested the diagnosticity of 
disillusionment features using these three categories. 
More prototypical features are more representative, or closer to the meaning, of the 
superordinate concepts they define (Rosch, 1978). Thus, the more central a category of 
features is to the concept of disillusionment, the more effectively they should convey the 
experience in a natural context. We created four vignettes to test this. One vignette was 
constructed using only central features of disillusionment, one using only intermediate 
features, and one using only peripheral features. Importantly, we also included a control 
vignette that described a negative experience of similar content, without referring to any of 
the features of disillusionment. Based on Study 1 and 2 findings, we hypothesised that 
vignettes constructed using disillusionment features would be more characteristic of 
disillusionment than the control vignette. Furthermore, we predicted that the prototypicality 
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of each category would be reflected in disillusionment ratings. Specifically, the scenarios 
described using central features and intermediate features should be more prototypical of 
disillusionment than the scenario described using peripheral features. 
Methods 
Participants and design. As in Study 1, we recruited participants with an invitation 
via email to the entire student population on an Irish university campus. Initially, the survey 
received 221 responses. As in Study 2, participants were excluded if they spent under 2 
minutes on the survey (n =45) or were non-native English speakers (n =21). Overall, 155 
participants (91 women; Mage = 23.98, SD =7.76; age range: 18-53 years) took part in Study 3 
and met these criteria2. We used a within-subjects design, meaning that each participant read 
all four vignettes (central, intermediate, peripheral, and control).  
Materials and procedure. Participants were invited to take part in a study about 
identifying emotional experiences, and read four short scenarios describing a person’s 
experience in a new job (Appendix A). Each scenario featured the same unpleasant job 
experience. Across three of the four scenarios, the description of the character’s experience 
was embedded with either central (centrality: M = 5.68, SD =.33), intermediate (centrality: M 
= 5.51, SD =.45) or peripheral features (centrality: M = 4.80, SD =.28) of disillusionment. For 
the control vignette, the same negative job experience was described using words of negative 
valence that we did not identify as features of disillusionment in Study 1 (e.g., difficult, 
distress, challenge, and struggle). 
After each vignette, participants rated the extent to which the scenario described a 
disillusioning experience on a seven-point scale from 1 (not at all disillusioning) to 7 
(extremely disillusioning). To control for any effect of the described characters’ gender, 
                                                          
2 The student sample and the lack of financial compensation offered here may explain the lower percentage of 
retained participants compared to the Study 2. 
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approximately half of participants read a scenario describing a male’s experience and the 
others read the scenario describing a female’s experience. 
Results and Discussion 
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA to determine the effect of vignette type 
on disillusionment ratings. The overall omnibus effect of vignette type was significant, F(3, 
462) = 174.56, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .531. We tested planned contrasts between each of the 
prototypical vignettes and the control vignette. As hypothesised, the experience described in 
the control vignette (M = 2.16, SD = 1.26) was rated as significantly less disillusioning than 
the experiences described in the peripheral (M = 4.73, SD = 1.62), t(154) = 15.48 p < .001, d 
= 1.27, intermediate (M = 5.19, SD = 1.64), t(154) = 18.56 p < .001, d = 1.50, and central (M 
= 5.21, SD = 1.61) vignettes, t(154) = 18.64 p < .001, d = 1.51. Furthermore, among the 
vignettes containing disillusionment features, the peripheral vignette was rated as less 
disillusioning than both the intermediate, t(154) = 2.99 p = .003, d = .24, and central 
vignettes, t(154) = 3.25 p = .001, d = .27. There was no significant difference between ratings 
of the central vignette and ratings of the intermediate vignette. 
To explore if the gender of the person described had an effect on disillusionment 
ratings across vignettes, we ran a 4 × 2 mixed ANOVA on disillusionment ratings with 
vignette as a within-subjects factor and the gender of the vignette character as a between-
subjects variable. Crucially, we found there was no significant vignette × gender interaction, 
F(3,459) = 1.33, p =.26, η𝑝
2  = .009, indicating that the effect of vignette type on 
disillusionment ratings was not significantly influenced by the gender of the character in the 
vignette.  
 These results demonstrate that the features of disillusionment identified in Study 1 
convey the experience when used to describe a negative life event. All three vignettes 
embedded with features of disillusionment described a disillusioning event more effectively 
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than the vignette embedded with control words. Moreover, we found support for the 
prototypical structure we established using the results of Studies 1 and 2. Specifically, 
vignettes embedded with central or intermediate features were rated as more disillusioning 
than the peripheral vignette. Thus, the representativeness of these features varies in prototype 
fashion. Importantly, these results complement our findings from Studies 1 and 2 by 
demonstrating that these features portray the experience of disillusionment when placed in a 
meaningful context. These findings support the notion that three prototypical categories may 
be necessary for particularly complex phenomenon that vary readily across contexts (Gregg 
et al., 2008) 
Study 4: Distinguishing Disillusionment from Disappointment 
 Study 3 tested and confirmed that the features we derived (Study 1) represent the 
concept of disillusionment accordingly in a given context. However, we did not test how well 
these features distinguish disillusionment from other similar experiences. Consistently, an 
issue with previous operational definitions of disillusionment is that in some cases they seem 
similar to disappointment (e.g., performing below expectations on a task; Heath and Jourden, 
1997; see also “disillusionment,” [def. 2], n.d.) and in Studies 1-3 we established that 
disappointment is a central feature of disillusionment. For these reasons, we investigated if 
the features we derived can distinguish disillusionment from disappointment—a seemingly 
similar affective state.  
 We test the distinctiveness of disillusionment features by asking people to generate 
instances of both disillusionment and disappointment (counterbalanced), before in each case 
rating how well the features we have established relate to each one. Three possible outcomes 
to this test vary in how much they support the distinct quality of disillusionment. A null result 
(i.e., no difference feature ratings), would suggest that these features do not distinguish 
disillusionment from disappointment. A difference in intensity only (i.e., a main effect of 
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emotion), would suggest that disillusionment is distinct from disappointment, but may also 
support the interpretation that it is an extreme form of disappointment. That is, if each feature 
is rated higher in disillusionment in a uniform fashion. Finally, a difference in content and 
intensity (i.e., an emotion × feature category interaction) would suggest that disappointment 
is distinct in quality and quantity. In this case, the difference in feature ratings would not be 
uniform and not indicative of more intense and less intense instances of the same underlying 
experience.  
Going beyond Study 3, we aimed to examine how well features distinguish 
disillusionment from disappointment using participants’ self-generated instances of both 
experiences, thus accounting for variations in contextual features. This is important because 
there may be different forms of disillusionment (e.g., romantic disillusionment; Niehuis et al., 
2019) that vary by context and prototypical features of the experience should capture all 
forms. Testing how well features represent self-generated disillusionment experiences 
provides a stringent test of the generalizability of our findings. 
Methods 
Participants. We used a within-subjects design to maximise statistical power and 
based our sample size on previous prototype research (Hepper et al., 2012; Kinsella et al., 
2015). We recruited 64 participants (44 women; Mage = 36.94, SD = 11.94; age range: 18 – 64 
years) for a within-subjects study via Prolific Academic. Participants were required to be 
fluent English speakers to take part. They were compensated with 1 pound Sterling for their 
participation. Four participants were removed for failing an attention check that asked them 
to identify the fourth word in a simple sentence. 
Materials and procedure. In two separate writing tasks, participants were asked to 
provide an example of a disillusioning and a disappointing experience. In particular, we gave 
them the following instructions: “Think about the experience of disillusionment 
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(disappointment). In the box below, write about a brief example of a disillusioning 
(disappointing) experience. It can be about you or about someone else.” After writing about 
each experience (see Appendix B for examples), participants were presented with the 
disillusionment features from Study 1, accompanied by contextual information (see Table 1), 
and asked to rate how closely each feature related to the experience they described. That is, 
each participant gave an example of a disillusioning and a disappointing experience and rated 
how well disillusionment features related to each experience. We randomized the 
presentation order of the writing tasks (disillusionment and disappointment) and features (see 
Table 1).  
Results and Discussion 
 We conducted a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on feature ratings; emotion (disillusionment vs. 
disappointment) was the within-subjects factor and order of presentation was the between-
subjects factor. As predicted, there was a main effect of emotion, with participants rating 
disillusionment experiences (M = 5.23, SD = 1.13) higher than disappointing experiences (M 
= 4.84, SD = 1.12), F(1,58) = 6.90, p =.011, η𝑝
2  = .11. Importantly, there was no effect of 
order, (F < 1) and no order × emotion interaction (F < 1). 
 To test how feature ratings differed across categories of prototypicality, we conducted 
a 3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with emotion (disillusion vs. disappointment) and 
category (central vs. intermediate vs. peripheral) as within-subjects factors. There was a main 
effect of emotion (means as above; F(1,59) = 6.83, p = .011, η𝑝
2  = .10) and a main effect of 
category, F(1,59) = 41.23, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .41. As predicted, central features were rated 
highest (M = 5.42, SD = 0.99), followed by intermediate features (M = 5.12, SD = 1.09), with 
peripheral features rated lowest (M = 4.56, SD = 1.11). A simple effects analysis of category 
ratings within the disillusionment condition revealed that there was a multivariate effect of 
category, F(2, 58) = 21.72, p <.001. Pairwise comparisons reveal that peripheral features (M 
DISILLUSIONMENT  19 
 
= 4.68, SD = 1.40) were rated significantly lower than both central (M = 5.54, SD = 1.20), 
t(59) = 6.83 p <.001, d = .83 and intermediate features (M = 5.45, SD = 1.21), t(59) = 5.60 p 
< .001, d = .72. There was no significant difference between central and intermediate 
features. This pattern of findings is consistent with those of Study 3. 
 The mixed design ANOVA also revealed a significant emotion × feature interaction, 
F(2,118) = 4.30, p = .016, η𝑝
2  = .07. Simple effects analysis showed that, for intermediate 
features, disillusioning experiences (M = 5.45, SD = 1.20) were rated significantly higher 
than disappointing experiences (M = 4.78, SD = 1.39), t(59) = 3.68 p = .001, d = .48. 
Disillusioning experiences were also rated more highly on central features (M = 5.54, SD = 
1.20), compared to disappointing experiences (M = 5.30, SD = 1.13) and the same is true for 
peripheral features (M = 4.68, SD = 1.40, M = 4.45, SD = 1.24, respectively). However, these 
differences were not significant (p =.13, p =.22, respectively). These data suggest that 
intermediate features are particularly useful for distinguishing disillusionment from 
disappointment, but not central features. Given that disappointment is a central feature of 
disillusionment, but naturally rated as more closely associated with disappointing 
experiences, it is plausible that this feature skews the mean ratings of features from the 
central category. Therefore, to investigate if other core features of disillusionment distinguish 
these experiences we conducted additional analyses of these simple effects after removing 
disappointment as a core feature. 
Additional Analysis. We removed the confounding feature of disappointment from 
our analysis and ran a follow-up mixed design ANOVA with the same variables as above. 
The main effect of emotion was retained F(1,59) = 8.98, p = .004, η𝑝
2  = .13, as was the 
overall interaction effect, F(2,118) = 3.29, p = .04, η𝑝
2  = .05. However, simple effects 
analyses revealed that, with the omission of disappointment as a feature, central features were 
now significantly more associated with disillusioning experiences (M = 5.39, SD = 1.27), 
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compared to disappointing experiences (M = 4.94, SD =1.23), t(59) = 2.62 p = .011, d = .34. 
As before, these emotions differ in intermediate features but not peripheral features. These 
findings offer support for the prototypicality of the central features we derive. 
 The results of this study further substantiate the prototypical nature of the 
disillusionment features we distilled. Conforming the results of Study 3, central and 
intermediate features were more closely associated with disillusionment compared to 
peripheral features. Furthermore, the findings of this study clarify that these features 
distinguish disillusionment from a seemingly similar experience.  
General Discussion 
We conducted four studies examining lay conceptions of disillusionment. Our 
findings organise these conceptions into a prototype structure of more and less representative 
features. In Studies 1 and 2, we explored the open-ended generation of disillusionment 
features and ratings of their centrality. Combining the NVivo analysis of Study 1 with the 
centrality ratings in Study 2 we identified a set of 19 disillusionment features that varied in 
their representativeness. In Study 3, we embedded these features into meaningful contexts 
and assessed their diagnosticity. Participants rated scenarios embedded with these features as 
more disillusioning than similar scenarios embedded with negative, but non-disillusioning 
features. These vignette ratings also supported the ordinal structure of the prototype 
categories we created. In Study 4, participants rated self-generated disillusioning experiences 
as more representative of our features when compared with disappointing experiences. Thus, 
the features established in Study 1, effectively distinguish disillusioning experiences from 
highly similar emotional events. Collectively, these studies reveal the prototypical nature of 
the disillusionment concept. 
The central features of disillusionment convey its affective and epistemic nature. 
Feeling, disappointment, and loss all relate to affective states that, in context, reflect a 
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negative valence. The remaining central features (discovery, expectations, false/wrong, and 
reality) highlight the fact that this negative affect is associated with knowledge falsification. 
We found that the representativeness of confusion, goodness, loss of trust and betrayal varied 
between Study 1 and Study 2 and choose to categorize these as intermediate features whose 
representativeness may be less central, but not peripheral. Finally, peripheral features 
included components related to motivation impulses (e.g., orientation), or the lack thereof 
(hopelessness). Although negative affect characterizes disillusionment, sadness was rated as a 
peripheral feature.  
Fit with Previous Theory and Research 
To date, research on the conceptualization of disillusionment has been rare, yet our 
research findings fit well with previous studies in related areas. Niehuis and Bartell (2006) 
made the most systematic attempt to measure disillusionment with the Marital 
Disillusionment scale (see also Niehuis et al., 2019). Although, this scale measures 
disillusionment specifically in the context of marriage, many of the items correspond to the 
features of disillusionment identified here. For example, items specifically refer to 
disappointment, expectancy violation, feeling tricked/cheated or deceived, confusion, loss of 
drive and hopelessness. Moreover, these appear to measure a single underlying factor 
(Niehuis & Bartell, 2006). While there have been few other systematic attempts to measure 
disillusionment, the experience was previously classified by Clore, Ortony, and Foss (1987) 
as an affective cognitive condition and the features we have identified in this research 
confirm this classification. More specifically, disillusionment is conceptualized as a state of 
epistemic negative affect. The experience also appears to share many common features with 
the concept of meaning threat.  
Knowledge structures form an important basis for a person’s well-being and sense of 
meaning in life (Heine et al., 2006; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Indeed, constructing assumptions 
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about the world and the self is an important function of human cognitive and motivational 
systems (Pekrun et al., 2016). On this basis, the violation of knowledge structures should be 
associated with affective and emotional turmoil. Recently there has been renewed interest in 
emotions associated with knowledge falsification and generation. Pekrun et al. (2016) defines 
epistemic emotions as emotion aroused by cognitive incongruity, with knowledge or 
knowledge generation as the object focus. While it may not qualify as a prototypical emotion, 
disillusionment fits the definition of a state of negative epistemic affect. However, unlike 
other epistemic states such as confusion, disillusionment appears to be broader and associated 
with more extreme epistemic violations. These features give the experience an existential 
character (Van Tilburg et al., 2019). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
A prototype analysis is one way of determining how lay people represent concepts but 
there are limitations to this approach (Clore & Ortony, 1991; Medin & Ortony, 1989). We 
acknowledge that prototypical conceptions are insufficient to fully define emotional 
experiences. As Clore and Ortony (1991) state, prototypes apply more to conceptions of 
emotions than to emotions themselves. They may nevertheless be useful for the identification, 
classification, and recognition of emotional occurrences. Consistently, we have demonstrated 
that people recognise and distinguish the experience of disillusionment based on the 
prototypical features we established. The functions of conceptions are broader than 
recognition and classification (see Smith & Medin, 1981), but identifying the prototypical 
features of lay conceptualisation provides valuable information. For example, knowing how 
people distinguish disillusionment from similar features like disappointment will allow 
researchers to better establish divergent validity in their measurements, even if it these 
features do not fully explain the divergent causes of these experiences. 
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The demographics of our study samples limit the conclusions we can draw from this 
research. The average age of our participants was relatively young and given the study 
recruitment procedure, there was likely to be an overrepresentation of students. A sample of 
older participants may have different impressions of disillusionment. Also, participants 
largely originated from English speaking nations. Many emotions (such as fear) have strong 
cross-cultural consistency, but this may not be the case for more complex affective states. 
Experiences like disillusionment or nostalgia are likely shaped by social and cultural 
influences (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). Indeed, the specific cultural 
worldview that one applies to their understanding of the world will likely dictate which 
experiences one finds disillusioning or not. Future research should explore the possibility that 
disillusionment is conceived differently across cultures. 
The choice of disappointment as the comparison emotion in Study 4 complicated our 
findings. Specifically, the fact that the experience qualified as a central feature of 
disillusionment confounded our analysis of category effects. Nevertheless, given that 
disappointment and disillusionment overlap to some extent, it was necessary to demonstrate 
their distinctiveness. Indeed, previous research has also sought to differentiate these 
experiences using different methods (Niehuis et al., 2019). Moreover, the experiential overlap 
of the experiences provided a stringent test of the degree to which the features we distilled are 
representative of disillusionment. For example, it would be less informative if these features 
proved more disillusioning in comparison to happiness or anger where there is not much 
experiential overlap. The fact that they distinguish disillusionment from a highly similar 
effective state is evidence of their prototypical functions (Rosch, 1978).  
Conclusion 
 Our research systematically examined lay conceptions of a profound, often life-
changing, experience: disillusionment. Adopting a prototype approach, we found that people 
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conceive disillusionment as an experience that concerns a person’s knowledge of the truth. It 
can lead people to question their understanding of reality or to question the benevolence of 
the world they live in. Lay conceptualizations of disillusionment characterize it as a negative 
affective state arising from serious violations of core assumptions and resulting in sadness, 
confusion and disappointment, as well as a loss of trust and hope. This research establishes a 
prototype concept that can inform future investigations of the nature of disillusionment. 
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Table 1 
Disillusionment features with sample contexts (Study1) and categories of centrality (Study 2) 
   Study 1 Study 2 
Vignette 
Categories 




Central Discovery  Discovering that something was not as  
good as one believed it to be 
3.63 6.00 
Central Feeling  Feeling upset/feeling lost 3.49 5.34 
Central Disappointment  An intense feeling of disappointment 2.21 6.02 
Central Loss  A sense of loss/ loss of drive 2.00 5.31 
Central Expectations  Expectations have not been meet 1.42 5.89 
Central False/Wrong  Wrong perception/being proved wrong 1.14 5.50 
Inter Reality  Woken up to reality/Reality setting in. 1.03 5.57 
Inter Thinking  I don't know what to think anymore 3.30 4.98 
Inter Confusion  A sense of confusion 1.08 5.10 
Inter Goodness/benevolence Not as good as you envisioned 0.97 5.09 
Inter Illusion I felt tricked 0.56 6.00 
Inter Trust (loss of) More cynical/less trusting 0.52 5.89 
Inter Betrayal/Deception Feeling cheated 0.51 5.94 
Periph Orientation Direction/change of direction 0.91 4.57 
Periph Hopelessness Abandoning hope 0.89 5.16 
Periph Truth To bring to light the truth of a subject 0.69 4.76 
Periph Sadness Sadness/unhappiness 0.69 5.09 
Periph Idea A preconceived idea 0.63 4.46 
Periph Bad The world is bad 0.50 4.74 
 
 
Note: central= central category, inter= intermediate category, periph= peripheral category 




When Person X started his(her) new job with a homelessness charity his(her) expectations 
were high. Finally (s)he would be doing work that would make a difference in people’s lives. 
However, over time (s)he discovered that this job was not what (s)he had hoped it would be. 
The reality of the situation made him feel increasingly disappointed. There was little (s)he 
could do to help people struggling to find a home. He had been proven wrong. Now (s)he is 
feeling down and has lost his(her) drive and motivation. 
Intermediate Vignette  
Person W has recently started a new job with a homelessness charity. However, now (s)he is 
beginning to feel cheated. (S)He had been tricked into thinking (s)he would be able to make a 
big difference in homeless people’s lives. Now it is clear to him(her) that this position is not 
as good as it was made out to be. (S)He feels confused and does not know what to think 
anymore. The experience has made him(her) more cynical and less trusting. 
Peripheral Vignette 
Person V has recently started a new job with a homelessness charity. (S)He previously had 
preconceived ideas of how this job would work but since then (s)he has found out the truth. It 
is clear to him(her) that (s)he cannot help people in this role the way (s)he had hoped (s)he 
could.  Taking this job was a bad idea. (S)He feels sad and has abandoned his(her) hopes of 
making it work. (S)He has decided that he needs a change of direction. 
Control Vignette  
Person Z has recently started a new job at a homeless charity. It requires him(her) to work 
long hours and (s)he is finding the job difficult. (S)He knew this job would be tough so the 
situation (s)he finds himself in is not totally unexpected. Fighting homelessness is a serious 
challenge and it can be hard to watch people in distress. Although, (s)he is struggling 
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somewhat, (s)he is determined to keep working and believes (s)he can find a way to manage 
the stresses of this new job. 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Disillusionment Examples of Disappointment 
Participant 1 
During my third year at university, I became 
very aware that my chosen field of profession 
was not going to be enjoyable… 
One of my areas of investment has a daily 
lottery, which is currently ongoing. This is for 
shareholders, and each has a 6% chance of 
winning each day. Yet I have not won once. 
Participant 2 
My partner of many years, whom I trusted, left 
me for someone else with almost no warning. 
I was disappointed when my meal at a 
restaurant didn't taste good and wasn't a good 
use of my money. 
Participant 3 
I felt generally disillusioned with British politics 
after the referendum. It seemed impossible to 
obtain reliable information both sides of the 
argument seemed to use misinformation and this 
seemed to happen across all the political 
parties. 
As a child I really wanted a particular toy dog 
for Christmas I did not receive it and felt 
disappointed 
 
